Decision-making
Holly High, Souphinh Vongphachanh, Vilaythieng Sisouvong and Souliyong Thammavongsa
Submitted to Routledge, March 14th, 2025.
Abstract
The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) reserves for itself the role of leadership on all fronts. Some decisions in Laos are evidently driven by grassroots concerns, but the top-down structure can mean that people may feel that they have little say. This chapter draws on a recent study of policy making processes to argue that these seemingly contradictory elements—top-down and bottom-up decision-making—can be understood through the prism of democratic centralism.
Introduction
Decisions are made hierarchically in Lao PDR. The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) reserves for itself the role of leadership on all fronts (cf. Chapter 5). The Government of Laos (GoL) is tasked with implementation. Grassroots people, donors and industry are also expected to participate in decision making processes, perhaps through one of the ubiquitous consultation meetings, or by carrying out the work of a decision already made: both signs of local ownership. A saying goes ‘The Party leads, the Government manages, and the people are owners.’ Some decisions in Laos are evidently driven by grassroots concerns, but the top-down structure can mean that grassroots people may feel that they have little say. Monitoring and evaluation of implementation generates feedback and lessons learned, which can be used to modify or reverse high-level decisions. However, these mechanisms can be slow. This can contribute to the often-observed gap between policy and practice in Lao PDR, where top-level decisions may fail to materialise in practice. Conversely, the important role of feedback and inspection in altering decisions can also contribute to policy churn, where decisions are changed frequently, with often unsettling results at the grassroots level.
This chapter draws on a recent study of policy making processes to argue that these seemingly contradictory elements—top-down and bottom-up decision-making—can be understood through the prism of democratic centralism.[1] Our original study was specifically about the determinants of the uptake of scientific research into policy in Lao PDR, but yielded results relevant to understanding decision-making there more generally. The study included reviews of English and Lao language literature, ethnographic observation of the National Assembly and the ethnography of the creation of the Forestry Strategy 2035.[2] Using this evidence, we unpack democratic centralism as both a principle with clear ideological underpinnings and a practice observable in formal decision-making contexts today.
Democratic centralism is the hallmark principle of Marxist-Leninist parties. Soviet-scholar Michael Waller (1981) notes that democratic centralism is a contested concept, with Marxist-Leninist thinkers proposing a range of interpretations, and any given party adapting these in different ways at different times (1981,6). Still, appeals to democratic centralism ‘run like a central thread through the history of the movement since 1905’ (1981, 5). The original formulation of democratic centralism—as proposed by Lenin—emphasised free elections, accountability and recall of elected representatives, and the free circulation of ideas. Under Stalin, democratic centralism was reinterpreted to insist on unity in the party and to ban fractionalism. A ‘two term relationship’ was imagined, between ‘the masses’ and the party leadership. While the leadership was empowered to make decisions that were binding on the masses, it was also required to be responsive to the masses, reflecting majority will. This version of democratic centralism was a condition of entry into The Communist International and thus exported to other socialist movements, including the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP).[3]
In Laos, over time, democratic centralism has been used to justify a range of approaches to decision-making. In the war years and in the earliest years of the regime, democratic centralism was interpreted as a doctrine of unanimity behind the party central leadership. In the 1980s, Kaysone Phomvihane explained his ‘new imagination’ paradigm as a form of democratic centralism: here democratic centralism was described as an economic platform of free trade operating according to clear regulations and laws, and then as a regime of democratic political institutions expanding in line with social and cultural development. Kaysone often used the concept of democratic centralism to theorise a ‘dialectic’ between central leadership and grassroots initiative. He saw the value of both. He advocated a middle path between centralism (too much of which could lead to ‘absolute power’) and democracy (which, if untethered, could lead to anarchy).
As a mode of decision-making in contemporary Laos, democratic centralism can be defined as a formal process for generating consensus. The process begins with a need: a topic is raised which demands a decision. This triggers research on the relevant topic. The research findings are tabled for consultation. Feedback is sought from many parties. Results of the consultation are summarised and then a vote is taken. The majority carry the day, and after that, the topic is no longer open for discussion. The next stage is implementation. At this point, feedback, inspections and lessons learnt from implementation again allow people to review the decision and suggest changes based on observable realities. Significant negative feedback may trigger a revision to the decision. The new decision is then adhered to and put into implementation, beginning the feedback cycle again. This is, of course, an idealized version of how democratic centralism is supposed to work in the best-case scenario. Democratic centralism in principle is quite different from democratic centralism in practice.
Below we present two glimpses of democratic centralism as it was evident as a mode of decision-making in our 2020-2021 study. First, we look at the formal principle of democratic centralism in the political structure of Laos, and the ideological underpinnings of the principle as evident in Kaysone Phomvihane’s speeches. Second, to glimpse democratic centralism in practice, we report on ethnographic observations of how people conducted themselves in meetings, presented their views, and responded to decisions during our study.
The political structure of Lao PDR
The Party, the Government of Laos, and the National Assembly all operate, officially, according to the principle of democratic centralism. As described in Chapter 5, the Party is the leading decision-maker in Laos. Kaysone described the LPRP as:
The leading political organization and a frontline fort led by the organizations of the working class and patriotic labor of all ethnicities working in unity in a political system, in all the state’s operations, and in society (1997: 466).
The head of state is the President. While the President is largely a figurehead, representing Laos at formal meetings and presiding over award ceremonies and so on, the role is also very powerful because, since 1998, the President is also the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee, a key decision-making body. The official duties of the President include promulgating laws already passed by the National Assembly (NA); proposing to the NA the appointment or removal of a Prime Minister (PM); granting the nation’s highest medals and awards; pardoning criminals; receiving diplomats and appointing them on recommendation the PM; issuing ratifications of treaties; issuing Presidential edicts and decrees which have been drafted by the GoL and passed by the NA, and so on.
The NA is the peak legislative body. It is composed of elected representatives. Every 50,000 citizens are represented by an Assembly member. Elections are held every five years. Citizens over 18 are eligible to vote, by means of universal suffrage and secret ballot. There is a very close relationship between the NA and Party: in the 9th legislature of the National Assembly, all but three were Party members, and only six stood as independents. As one newspaper report commented, NA members ‘must have strength enough to carry two important duties. Namely: “Those who lead and those who serve love the people’s Party”’ (Amphai 2021: 36). The NA has numerous responsibilities (see Dahuai et. al. 2017, 4219 for a full list). One of our informants, who had served in the NA, listed the most significant as: 1) Considering, approving and making decisions on important issues; 2) Monitoring the administration and governing bodies in their performance and implementation according to the rule of law; 3) Approving laws and legislations; and 4) Representing the people.
There is a direct hotline to NA when it is in session. This line is for people to voice their complaints or give comments directly to the NA. In the first session of 2020 the line received more than 490 calls. The summary reported that the calls addressed a total of 72 kinds of problems and concerns. Among these, the more prominent problems were: the price of electricity, land disputes, road construction, governance of the currency exchange rate, drug addiction and court decisions. One interviewee, a former NA member, told us that the comments given on the hotline are all recorded and treated with gravity: ‘whatever issue is shared by the people, we have to respect them all.’ A standing committee categorises the contents of the calls and sends them to the relevant authorities for a response. This NA member said that sometimes the calls could be quite repetitive, with different callers or even the same caller raising the same issue again and again (home schooling during COVID lockdown was a particularly oft-raised issue in his session). As a result, he said, the government had become more proactive, pre-emptively providing information on issues likely to be a wide popular concern.
The head of the GoL is the PM. The PM is responsible for the activities of the GoL, chairing its high-level meetings and making key appointments and promotions (Vice PMs, Ministers, Vice-Ministers, Provincial Chiefs, etc). The PM is responsible for reporting the activities of the GoL to the NA for scrutiny. During our observation of the NA, the then PM, Phankham Viphavan, addressed the assembly and referred to his role as ‘commander-in-chief’ of government initiatives, for instance the National Agenda introduced to the NA in 2021, and referred to his Deputy PMs as each having specific areas of ‘command.’
The Ministries are arranged along technical lines, reflecting different sectors (Agriculture, Education, Health etc). For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry mandate states that it must:
Sometimes, this can involve law-making, in which case legislation proposed by a Ministry may be approved directly by the PM Office, or if it involves many sectors, it will be tabled at the NA for discussion. But more often Ministries operate at a lower level, creating regulations under existing laws, rather than proposing to change the law. Many staff of Ministries, universities and research institutes are also Party members. One NUoL researcher we interviewed explained:
it is like you cannot separate them at all. The Party work is often part of day-to-day work, not separate. Party meetings often take place at one’s place of work and during working hours as part of one’s work. Often the head of the Party Unit is the head of the division or department—it is the same person. The Party work is about leadership and directions. The government work is about implementation.
Party meetings take up about one day out of every five for Party members who also work in government offices or institutes, although time spent in Party meetings fluctuates according to the issues at hand. These competing demands can be difficult to balance.
Provincial Governors are responsible for convening high-level meetings in their Provinces, overseeing planning and budgeting, and implementing national laws and plans (or advising when these cannot be implemented due to ‘conflicts’) (Dahuai et. al. 2017, 4221). They oversee appointments, promotions and reviews of staff in Provincial and District government positions, including leadership positions in the local offices of the Ministries. District Governors have very similar remits in their own Districts. The Provincial and District Governors are permitted to issue edicts, orders and decisions. Yet, in his speech to the NA, the PM said that the highest authority at a Provincial level is in fact the Provincial Party Secretary. Phankham said, ‘They give commands, on behalf of the government, on every affair in their own provinces.’
Provincial and District staff—the ones often tasked with implementing a centrally made decision—may thus answer to multiple lines of authority, or what Lao often refer to as vertical and horizontal lines. The ultimate authority over their work, the Provincial Party Secretary, is a representative of the Party. Yet staff may also report to the Director General of a line ministry office, who in turn is appointed by the Provincial Governor (or in the case of District staff, the District Governor) and endorsed by the Provincial Assembly, but also take leadership from the Central level of their Ministry on ‘technical questions’ (as PM Phankham out it). In addition, Provincial and District Planning departments hold significant power, because no project, even those with Central or Ministerial backing, will proceed unless it is approved there. Some of this is simpler than it looks: in practice the Provincial Party Secretary is often also the same person as the Provincial Governor. But there is some evidence that Provincial (and District) level staff do face difficulties as a result of these multiple lines of authority (Smith et. al. 2020). There have been very few studies of Provincial and District level decision making (although see Singh 2012 on District bureaucrats), and there is particularly little currently available to shed light on how Provincial decision makers juggle their responsibilities to multiple ‘levels above’ while also adapting Central directions to the particular needs and circumstances of their Provinces. What is clear, however, is that Provinces, Districts and Villages are also very important sites, not only of implementation, but also of political decision making in Laos.
The Village administration is lead by a Village Head who is responsible for maintaining peace and development in the village, disseminating laws, policies and guidance from the levels above; improving the population (ensuring education, sanitation, cultural development, employment etc); chairing village level administration meetings; issuing local-level ordnances; and conflict resolution.[4]
Ideological underpinnings
The impact of socialist thinking can be observed in many contemporary elements of politics in Laos. For instance, there is still a strong emphasis on planning and setting targets; emulation remains a key means of inspiring the population; and equality is a freqeuntly stated policy goal: whether one lives in the city or the country, the uplands or the lowlands, there should be access to an equal standard of living. In terms of decision-making, among the most significant legacies of Marxist-Leninist doctrine in Lao PDR is the enshrinement and embodiment of democratic centralism as the principle by which decisions are made in Lao PDR. In this section, we examine the ideological underpinnings of decision making in Laos through attention to Kaysone Phomvihane’s Thought, particularly his thoughts about decision making and his definitions of democratic centralism.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Kaysone Phomvihane’s Thought (KPT) is often referred to by contemporary Lao political leaders to legitimize processes and decisions. Therefore, to understand decision-making in Laos, it is useful to have a grasp of KPT. In Kaysone’s speeches, the influence of Marxist-Leninism is clear. The most commonly authority he cites, according to a review of his speeches we conducted, was Lenin. Kaysone also evoked (to a much lesser extent) Marx, Engels, and Ho Chi Minh. The next most common influences evoked by Kaysone were existing decisions, such as standing resolutions from the Politburo, planning targets, existing PM Orders. An example is this passage from a Kaysone XX speech, which is quite typical of his style:
Since the 5th Congress (Session II) of the Party’s Central Committee, our party has established a policy that states: ‘To build an economy at a national level and promote the growth of the economy at a sub-national level pursuant to a commonly agreed national economic structure.’ Then, the resolutions of the 6th and 7th Congress of Party Central Committee also re-emphasized such issues. Recently, in the III Party Congress, the 3rd and 4th Meeting of Party Central Committee (Session III), and resolutions of the Politburo of Party Central Committee, also set a clear target that states, ‘we have to be confident in decentralizing authorities for economic management to local levels and agencies.’ (2005:140)
One observes here that decisions are presented as emerging out of a series of already-established decisions. Even when – as is the case with this speech – Kaysone is actually describing a policy shift, it is still presented as emerging from a consensus, not a conflict. Kaysone never names people whose opinion he disagrees with, nor does he identify factions of the party he opposed. Rather, he consistently presents decisions as arising from broad agreement, with the only real problems being lack of understanding or imperfect implementation.
Kaysone also frequently referred to the unique circumstances of Laos in his speeches. He spearheaded what he called ‘a righteous localization of Marxist-Leninism into our country’s context’ (1997: 336). This involved identifying what it was that was specific about Laos, and tailoring Leninism-Marxism to suit that context. Among the most commonly Lao ‘characteristics’ mentioned by Kaysone were social-cultural characteristics. He glossed the Lao as having the positive attributes of being ‘patriotic, harmonious, compromising, loving, generous, honest, hardworking, and fair’: positives which could be built on. But he also states that Lao people tended to be ‘idealistic, have a simple one-sided view (not thinking critically),’ and to ‘lack in fluidity and ownership, stick to old ways, and put their own kin, lineage and ethnic interests above all’, elements that the Party would need to work to overcome (2005, 45). He spoke approvingly of the legitimate aspirations grassroots people have for improved standards of living, and viewed the role of the Party as answering those aspirations.
Among the special characteristics of Laos to be taken into consideration in implementing Marxist-Leninism were the inexperience and low capacity of personnel, the serious destruction caused by the war, and natural conditions, such as the mountainous terrain and recurrence of drought and flooding, as well as an abundance of natural resources. He understood the economic conditions of Laos as extremely limited: with little productive capacity at the time, the LPRP came to power in a context of a mostly ‘natural’ economy of ‘scattered’ smallholders operating in a subsistence based agricultural sector, and limited infrastructure such as roads. Internationally, Kaysone’s speeches often reveal a sense of siege. With the fall of the Eastern Bloc, for example, he warmed ‘the hostile force has never given up their dark tactics that aim to destroy our new regime. They actively continue orchestrating their “peaceful evolution” plots in various new forms, focusing now on economy and politics instead of military force.’ (2005, 50). This is one of many statements about ‘enemies’ that we found in our review of KPT. In our ethnographic work of contemporary policy processes, likewise, we found that circumstances were one of the most common motivations cited for policy decisions. These were sometimes supported by citations of statistics, and sometimes supported by stories drawn from a delegate’s own experiences and observations. During our observation of the NA, these included budget limitations, debt and COVID-19. We can conclude, then, that while Marxist-Leninist ideology is an important factor in decision making in Laos, this has always been subject to adaptation to the specific circumstances present in Laos. Decisions, under KPT, are often legitimated through appeals to ideology tempered with appeals to the necessities of particular circumstances.
Kaysone frequently stated that the state he envisioned for Laos would be ‘of the people, with the people and for the benefit of the people’ (e.g. 2005: 61) with the state ‘organized by the people and for the people’ (1997: 512). This phrase is still repeated in contemporary documents (e.g. Dahuai et. al. 2017, 4218; Amphai 2021: 36). While this is a cliché that may sound very familiar, it is also one of Kaysone’s definitions of democratic centralism. In a 1988 speech to the 5th Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee, Kaysone said:
Following Lenin’s instructions, we shall enhance democratic rights and collective rights of the masses. The word ‘democracy’ does not only mean that people can elect their representatives to be in a government but also means ensuring that the Party’s plans and the state’s policies all start from the needs and aspirations of workers. People shall have the right to be consulted with and to actively lead implementation of plans and policies (1997:187).
In comments made in a Central Level theoretical training session in 1984-85, Kaysone defined democratic centralism not only by this local consultation, but as a form of local ownership. He contrasted it with bureaucratic centralism. He defined bureaucratic centralism as a situation where decisions are only made at a high level, and those at the lower level are left waiting and following orders: ‘for policies, plans, prices, money and so on’ (1987: 230). Under democratic centralism, by contrast, decisions are still made at the higher level, but the lower level ‘take ownership. making use of and implement policies and plans.’ (1987: 230). For instance, if the centre decides a pricing and salary policy, the grassroots level would determine the actual prices and salaries (1987: 230). Citing Lenin, he defined democratic centralism as a form of central coordination and planning that facilitates the local potentials of creativity inherent in democracy, including local solutions and diversity in implementation, because ‘no one understands a local situation more than local people’ (1987: 230). Like Lenin, he thought that too much democracy without the countervailing force of centralism would lead to anarchy. He likened centralism and democracy to ‘two sides of the same coin that cannot and should not be separated’ (1987: 230).
In the 1988 speech to the Central Party Committee, Kaysone used ‘democratic centralism’ to mean listening to other’s points of view, and a form of collective decision-making, where there is discussion and scrutiny before a decision is made, and the decision then represents a resolution on the matter. The goal is ‘to enable everyone to understand and come to a strong consensus.’ (1997:184). Kaysone emphasised that decisions should serve the good of the whole nation, not just the class whose interests are served by the political party in power at the time (thus his opposition to multi-party democracy). He repeatedly contrasted democratic centralism with situations where a decision was made by whoever was at the desk at the time, or by officials who stayed in their offices and did not consult at the local level. By contrast, democratic centralism is a form of decision making that is deliberate and considered, with input from all relevant parties.
Democratic centralism, as it is understood and practiced in Laos, carries a strong accent on unity and solidarity. Even though it is formally a means of eliciting varied and diverse views on any given topic, the goal in these decision-making processes is always agreement.
Liberty, in Kaysone’s view, is quite dangerous and undesirable: if left unchecked, it would lead to violence, war and then an authoritarian regime. He said, ‘Actions that demonstrate freedom, a lack of discipline, localism, and unregulated small-scale production all deviate from the principle of democratic centralism’ (1986: 187). The centralism of democratic centralism allows the creative powers of democracy to be harnessed without deviating into anarchy. Thus, in democratic centralism the lower levels must always follow central directions, but equally the centre must listen to and be responsive to the lower levels.
In a 1991 speech to the 10th Plenary Meeting of the 4th Party Central Committee, reflecting on the recent experiences in Eastern Europe at the time, Kaysone warned that democracy was an evolutionary process. When ‘educational and cultural levels are low,’ he cautioned, ‘a high level of democracy … is impossible’ (1997:509). He recommended introducing democracy gradually, alongside socio-economic development. He suggested that democracy be introduced first in the economy, through freedoms of trade, and then scaled up. He saw this as an essential element in limiting the power of the Party. He warned that, without a steady increase in democracy, the Party would risk becoming ‘masters among revolutionaries’: corrupt, all-powerful, and violating people’s rights (1997:510). Kaysone cited Lenin, who had repeatedly warned that the greatest threat to a ruling Party is that of absolute power. Instead, Kaysone envisaged the role of the Party as ‘sincere servants’ of the people (1997:510).
Kaysone (1997:130) defined the grassroots as the level ‘where people live, work, engage in daily production, education and struggle’. He compared a leadership that is out of touch with the grassroots to a tree with a weak root system (1997:130). He often referred to the grassroots as real, or the reality of the situation, in contrast to the dreams of policy makers. He said, ‘(the state) needs a strong grassroots level otherwise its plans and polices are merely just a dream and exist only on paper.’ (1997:130)
Kaysone advocated for strong and regular consultation at a grassroots level, including the central leadership traveling for direct consultations with grassroots people:
For each grassroots level visit, we need to have a detailed workplan, including where, when, how long, and why? When there, we need to hear feedback from many people, including reports from leaders and listening to feedback from the people, the elderly people, the young people and so on. This will enable us to develop an in-depth understanding and a true nature of a situation before developing appropriate interventions. Otherwise, it will be like a medical doctor who does not know a patient’s illness. You prescribe a wrong medication. Our Lao saying also remind us to ‘scratch where it itches.’ (1997:189)
In our review of Lao literature, we found that periodicals such as Khosana and Alun Mai, butespecially the NA newspaper, Phuthaen Paxaxon, frequently report on the consultations delegates of both National and Provincial Assemblies make with the people in their constituencies. These visits are generally intended to follow up on and inspect ongoing policy initiatives, disseminate new policy directions, and hear feedback and concerns of people in their constituencies. Individuals can make direct appeals to the provincial assembly office when they encounter a problem, and the administration responds accordingly. These periodicals also carry stories about how delegates then strongly voice concerns and emerging issues that have been reported to them by the people in their constituencies in the NA or PPA. In addition, these periodicals frequently feature stories reporting directly on the concerns, views, and experiences of ‘grassroots’ level people.
Ethnographic realities of democratic centralism
Our goal in the following section is to bring democratic centralism out of the somewhat formal and official language of KPT, Leninist theory, and state news media reports, and show how it is part of the lived fabric of decision making in Laos. We will draw here particularly on our ethnographic observations of the NA and strategy consultation meetings in 2021, and also other ethnographic observations available in the literature.
June 2021. A consultation meeting has been called to diuscus a sectoral strategy document prepared by a Ministerial Secretariate. One breakout room is reserved for those who want to speak English. It is very different in style and tone from the rooms where people were speaking Lao. The English-speaking room is quite emotional, with people expressing frustration, disbelief, and strong opinions. The people in this room rearranged their chairs, spread out or stood up as they wished, perhaps to get a better view (as it was a bigger room). Some sat pushed back from the table, legs spread wide and elbows on knees, in quite a casual—or was it aggressive?—pose. The Lao-speaking rooms were more reserved. Long stretches of time in the breakout sessions were spent in total silence. When people did speak, it was with considerable formality. They often based their comments on their specific experiences or fields of expertise, rather than providing general and broad ranging comments. Physically, people largely remained in their chairs, and maintained the placement of the chairs neatly around the table. Everything offered in all the breakouts was supposed to be included in some way in the summary comments provided by the Chair of the room to the meeting coordinator at the end of the break-out. People in the Lao speaking rooms sometimes cooperated to assist the Chair to prepare these comments, with these comments becoming the focus of the work. In the English-speaking room, where the conversation was more free-ranging, meandering and inconclusive, the Chair expressed some concern about how to condense a meaningful summary from the session.
Democratic centralism is a style of decision making where consultation feeds into unity, in this case, where diverse comments are directed toward a common goal and can be summarised at the end. Consultation meetings like the one above occurred repeatedly throughout the production of this single strategy document. One of the Ministerial staff responsible for creating this document explained to us the process up to that point: it had begun with a consultative review of the previous strategy involving ‘many parties.’ The comments from these meetings were consolidated and fed into the draft of the new strategy. Then the Secretariate presented the draft to a steering committee for comments. The revised draft was then sent to ‘validation meetings’ at ‘the local level’ (in this case, meaning representatives from the Provinces).
‘We invited five sections from each province: Planning and Investment, Industry and Trade, Natural Resources, Agriculture and Forestry. In the meeting we discussed the draft strategy, which we took with us. They examined it and gave comments and feedback…’
At a minimun, our ethnographic study of policy making processes confirmed that consultations, meetings, and group approaches to identifying and addressing problems were very much part of the observable reality of decision making processes in Lao PDR.[5] Furthermore, the expectations for behaviour at these meetings included a certain style or presentation, especially in terms of how views could be presented.
First was the expectation that even if people express a diversity of views, some of which may contradict existing decisions, that these are typically framed not as arguments or even debates, but in more conciliatory terms: in the consultation meeting, we saw people offering opinions, views, and examples from their own experiences. Leaders and bosses gave guidance and advice. Among peers (such as members of the same Party cell) there is a requirement to monitor and critique one another’s behaviour, but this is framed as collegial feedback on strengths and weaknesses. When we asked one university researcher we interviewed how conflicts were handled in his department, he seemed puzzled by our question: ‘Arguments? No. We don’t have these. We would have to solve it internally. We don’t have disagreements.’ We believe that this demeanour is part of the lived reality of democratic centralism, insofar as it is an embodiment of the commitment to unity and solidarity as the end point of any decision making process.
This avoidance of argument and debate was even true in our observation of sessions of the NA. Noteably, ‘the NA is organised and implemented as according to the principle of democratic centralism and works through meetings, and takes decisions by majority vote’ (Dahuai et. al. 2017, 4220). We interviewed a previous NA member, who described the process there as ‘highly democratic’ in that everyone was free to give their opinions. However, when we watched the sessions, we did not see people debating or arguing. When NA members commented on proposed legislation and policy, it was universal to begin by noting agreement between themselves and others who had already spoken or tabled documents for discussion. One said, ‘As a people’s representative, I have trust in the leadership.’ Some even opened by stating directly that they intended to enhance unity and harmony with their comments.
However, they would go on to make suggestions for improvement, some quite significant: doubling targets in one case, in another, complaining revenue collection remains a problem ‘after a long time. We still have not seen any results’, and that this was related to too many restructures. This delegate suggested, ‘It might be better if we could stick to one change long enough to see the results, not go back and forth too quickly.’ In another example, a representative from Attapeu noted that many people displaced by the Se Pian-Se Nam Noi dam collapse were still living in temporary shelters. These are quite serious complaints, but were always framed with a great deal of respect and phrased in terms of agreement with the overall direction. These were presented as comments offered to improve a joint effort, not arguments made in a debate.
The former NA member that we interviewed noted the the democratic centralism of the NA is evident not just in the fact that many people offer their opinions, but also by the care and responsibility participants take with their comments. He said that democratic centralism is ‘also underpinned by a high level of responsibility taken by the members. This means that delegates are responsible for what they say. Their comments are based on evidence or technical principle. … everyone gets to say what they want, but responsibly.’ Again, this underlines that in democratic centralist decision making, the end point is unity and solidarity. The comments made along the way should be phrased with care, and perhaps even ‘rendered technical’ (Li 2007), to avoid creating or exacerbating ideological divisions.
The final stage of an NA session—as with a consultation meeting—involves summaries where the comments are merged into a final statement by the Chair. The Chair repeats the main points raised during the comments and instructs the GoL to consider and act on these. In some cases, Ministers will be asked to respond to specific points raised in the summary, and NA members again have a chance to ask questions and make comments to the Minister. These exchanges will also be summarised. The summaries are provided to the National Assembly Standing Committee, who oversees the GoL’s response to the comments. The GoL makes the appropriate changes, and then resubmits the document to the National Assembly Standing Committee, which makes the final decision on whether it can proceed to approval. If it does proceed, it is read again to the NA, where comments can again be collected, and where it may finally be passed as law, legislation, decree, PM Order, development plan or another document. In our analysis, it was notable that the names of NA delegates were not mentioned in the summaries: comments were aggregated and combined, so that the summary represented the response of the NA, not individuals. This again underlines the importance of the principle, so important under democratic centralism, of unity and harmony as the end goal after the elicitation of a diverse set of comments and opinions.
At a village level, meetings are also ubiquitous. Some of these are consultations, where people’s inputs are collected. But at this ‘grassroots’ level, these kinds of meetings often don’t visibly generate decisions (High 2014): key decisions are often made elsewhere. Feedback is collected and fed into these, but existing ethnographic accounts of village-level politics suggest that, from the point of view of an ordinary villager, decisions can often appear opaque and top-down, even if decision-makers are confident that they have indeed consulted the grassroots (High 2013, 2014). Even local decisions, such as arbitrations on disputes or family law, can appear as arbitrary: the Village Administration Committee (kanchattang ban) may consult widely before deliberating on a matter, but their deliberations may then be secret and once they reach a decision, it can carry the air of an unquestionable ruling.
Likewise with the NA: consultations can be quite open and wide ranging, even taking in to account hundreds of calls to the hotline, but the final decision is taken by the NA Standing Committee, a committee that meets privately. Indeed, the finality of a decision taken by a secret committee appears to be a key part of democratic centralism, just as much so as the wide-ranging consultation that ideally proceeds it. Kaysone articulated the ideal of a government ‘of the people, with the people, and for the people.’ Yet individual people’s voices—like the calls to a hotline, or comments made at a strategy document consultation or village meeting, or delegate’s comments at a NA session—are not set one against another. Instead, they are collated, summarised, and depersonalised. In the case of the NA, the final decision rests with the NA Steering Committee. In a village, it rests with the Village Administration Committee. In the Party, it rests with the Politburo. With the strategy document, it rests with the Secretariate. Again one sees here what Kaysone called the ‘two sides of the same coin’ (1987: 230) of democratic centralism. As a principle of decision making, democratic centralism entails wide consultation and grassroots feedback, but all of this diversity of opinion is supposed to lead to a unified final position. The final decision is taken by the leadership but supposed to reflect majority will. And once it is made, then, this decision is supposed to carry the weight of a collectively-made resolution of the matter. It is—technically speaking—supposed to be therefore above question, because all the questions should have been already raised during consultation. In practice, of course, questions are raised, but these are typically framed as issues of unforeseen problems in implementation or lack of understanding, not a challenge to the collectively-made decision.
References
Amphai Akkhalat. 2021. Khuamsamat nampha khong phak nai thana phak kam amnat khuan sadaeng ok naeodai? (How should the leadership of the party as a ruling party be expressed?). Khosana. 35 (235): 36-39.
Dahuai, Yu, Sybuamala Phouttaphone, Wu Jing. 2017. The role of Marxism in the Lao political system in the contemporary era. The International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Intervention. 4(12): 4216–4226.
GoL 2021. Decree on Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Organizational Structure and Operations No. 603/PM dated 15/10/2021.
High, Holly. 2022 Report on determinants of policy-making and research to policy impact in Laos identified through literature reviews (English and Lao) and ethnographic observation. Report for ACIAR Small research and development activity SSS/2020/142.
High, Holly. “Experimental Consensus: Negotiating with the Irrigating State in the South of Laos.” Asian Studies Review 37, no. 4 (2013): 491–508. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2013.794188.
High, Holly. 2014. Fields of Desire: Poverty and Policy in Laos. Fields of Desire: Poverty and Policy in Laos. NUS Press: Singapore.
High, Holly. 2021. Projectland: Life in a Lao socialist model village. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Kaysone Phomvihane. 1985. Niphon leuak fen (Selected Speeches). Vol. 1 On the National Democratic Revolution. State publishing house. Vientiane.
Kaysone Phomvihane. 1987. Niphon leuak fen (Selected Speeches). Vol. 2 On building the new era economy: The passage towards socialism. State publishing house. Vientiane.
Kaysone Phomvihane. 1997. Niphon leuak fen (Selected Speeches). Vol. 3 On the implementation of comprehensive reforms based on principles in Lao PDR. National Academy of Political and Public Administration. Vientiane.
Kaysone Phomvihane. 2005. Niphon leuak fen (Selected Speeches). Vol. 4 On the Establishment and Expansion of Lao People’s Democracy. Propaganda and Training of Party Central Committee. Vientiane.
Li, Tania Murray. 2007. The Will to Improve: Governmentality, development and the practice of politics. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Singh, Sarinda. 2012. Natural potency and political power: Forests and state authority in contemporary Laos. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Smith, Hilary, Lu, J., To, P. X., Mienmany, S. and Souphaxay, K. 2020. Rubber Plantation Value Chains in Laos: Opportunities and Constraints in Policy, Legality and Wood Processing.
Smith, Hilary, Holly High, Vilaythieng Sisouvong, Souliyong Thammavongsa, Saowapha Viravong, Souphinh Vongphachanh, Peter Kanowski. 2022. Research for policy in Lao PDR: Pathways to impact. A guidance document for researchers and policy practitioners. Australian Centre for International Agricultural Researcher SRA/2020/142.
Waller, Michael. 1981. Democratic Centralism: An historical commentary. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
[1] Commissioned by the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, it was a Small Research and Development Activity SSS/2020/142.
[2] The Lao literature review and ethnographic work would not have been possible without the contributions of Saowapha Viravong. Peter Kanowski and Hilary Smith provided comments and support.
[3] For an account of the evolution of the concept of democratic centralism in Lao PDR, see High forthcoming.
[4] Note from first author: I have written extensively elsewhere on the village level of the administration: see High 2013, 2014, 2021.
[5] As a core part of democratic centralism, the need for regular consultations was clearly stated by Kaysone. To choose just one of the many examples, he said:
The Party’s plans and state’s policies all start from the needs and aspirations of workers. People shall have the right to be consulted with and to lead an implementation of plans and policies actively. (1997:188)